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1. INTRODUCTION
Temporary measures are not new in Italy (Sartor, 1998;
Locarno and Staderini, 2007) but they have constantly played
a crucial role in the design of Italian fiscal policy only since
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty (Art. 104c)
requires member states to avoid deficits in excess of 3 per
cent of GDP, making this one of the convergence criteria for
the adoption of the euro. It does not prevent member states
using temporary measures to comply with the threshold.
Without temporary measures it is unlikely that the Italian
fiscal consolidation of the 1990s would have achieved its
main objective, i.e. Italy’s participation in EMU from the
beginning: in 1997 the deficit would probably have been over
the threshold of 3 per cent of GDP
2 and it is very unlikely,
had that been the case, that the list of EMU participants
drawn up in the spring of 1998 would have included Italy. As
we will show in this study, there has been no waning of the
role of temporary measures since.
Of course, other EU countries that have had difficulty
keeping the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP have also
commonly resorted to temporary measures (Koen and van
den Noord, 2005). Since their systematic use may contrast
with the objective of achieving a sound fiscal position, the
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2005
excluded the effects of temporary measures when
determining the budget balance relevant for the multilateral
surveillance procedure. Before the reform, the relevant
balance excluded only the effects of the cycle.
In this paper we examine the effects on the budget balance of
the temporary measures introduced by the Italian
government in the period 1997-2006. We also assess whether
it was appropriate to resort to them, as they were often aimed
at formally respecting the EU fiscal rules while postponing
the necessary structural adjustment. The starting year of our
analysis reflects the availability of data.
3 Each temporary
measure has had its specific motivations, independent from
its immediate impact on the balance. An evaluation of these
aspects is beyond the scope of this study. 
After 1997, the Government planned to progressively replace
temporary measures with more structural measures. This was
also consistent with Italy’s commitment, alongside the other
European partners in the SPG, to reach a budgetary position
in balance or in surplus in the medium term. This was true
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2The decision to speed up the consolidation process and target a deficit lower than 3 per cent of GDP in 1997 was taken relatively late, in the autumn of 1996. Given
the short time available and the large gap that had to be closed (in 1996 the deficit was still 7.0 per cent of GDP), it would have been extremely difficult for the Italian
Government to reduce the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP with structural measures alone.
3 Since 1997 the Bank of Italy has systematically provided information, in its official publications, on temporary measures affecting the budget balance. To extend the
analysis of temporary measures backwards, capital taxes can be used as a proxy for a major component of temporary measures, which includes tax amnesties and
extraordinary levies. Their average ratio to GDP is 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively in the 1980s, 1990s and in the years 2000-06.until 2000.
4 After that year, substantial use was again made of
temporary measures. 
In the theoretical literature and in policy practice different
reasons have been given to justify the use of temporary
measures.
5 At macro level, they may allow fiscal rules to be
complied with in years of political or economic emergency.
6
In periods of economic downturn, their non-permanent
nature may sometimes help fiscal authorities avoid
hampering a cyclical recovery.
7 At micro level, they can be
used to attain specific goals, such as inducing taxpayers to
declare hidden assets (Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 1996 and
1998), correcting distortions caused by tax rules, or
temporarily patching up a defective regulation.
8 With
particular regard to tax amnesties, other arguments have been
offered in the literature, including self-selection (Franzoni
1994; Cassone and Marchese 1995), insurance effects
(Andreoni 1991, Franzoni 1994 and 1996), and economizing
on prosecution costs (Chu, 1990, Kaplow and Shavell 1994).
In spite of these potential benefits, temporary measures are a
source of major concerns. First, their use reduces government
accountability as they can contribute to window-dressing and
reduce budget transparency. Second, in a situation of fiscal
imbalance, temporary interventions might delay the
necessary structural adjustment, which may prove to be very
costly. Moreover, at micro level, the use of temporary
measures can itself introduce new distortions in the economy
and have perverse effects on taxpayers’ expectations; a
typical example of this is given by tax amnesties, which might
encourage greater tax evasion in the future, as some studies
of the Italian experience have also shown (Marchese, 1997;
Fiorentini and Marchese, 1997).
9
Identifying temporary measures and assessing their effects is
not always straightforward. In the paper we use the criteria
adopted by the Bank of Italy and compare them with the
guidelines for identifying these measures recently provided
by the European Commission.
We also analyse the role of extraordinary operations that
have reduced the level of public debt while leaving the net
worth of the public sector broadly unchanged. As in the case
of temporary measures, it appears that these operations have
been at least partly motivated by the wish to comply with the
Maastricht Treaty rules
10 without incurring the political or
economic costs of more structural adjustment. 
The Italian government’s use of temporary measures and
extraordinary operation needs to be assessed in relation to the
overall development of Italy’s public finances. In the years
1998-2006 these deteriorated rapidly and uninterruptedly.
The primary balance, at 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1997, shrank
to virtually nil in 2006 (Figure 1). The extent of this
deterioration was not immediately clear in the public debate.
In the early years, the worsening of the primary balance was
offset by the reduction in interest payments. Moreover, initial
estimates of the yearly balance (made public by the National
Institute of Statistics in the spring of the following year) were
systematically more favourable than later assessments. Only in
2005 did the European Council identify the presence of an
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4 In this paper we report the budget balance in 2000 net of UMTS receipts, as this aggregate was the focus of the policy debate. In particular, the European Council
referred to it in its Opinions concerning the developments in public finances in member states. The European Commission also reported the deficits net of UMTS
receipts in its official publications (see e.g. European Commission, 2001, page 11). Accordingly, UMTS receipts are not included in the temporary measures.
5 A review of the literature and a summary of the main results can be found in the section “Tax policy and administration” of the World Bank website.
6This role for temporary measures is a consequence of the fact that fiscal rules need to be relatively simple. For a discussion see Kopitz and Symansky (1998).
7Temporary measures do not necessarily have less impact on the cycle than structural ones, especially if the latter have a positive impact on expectations or, for
example, enhance the system of incentives to work.
8 A typical example of this might be a real-estate tax amnesty in the case of residential areas that are not recognized as such because of bureaucratic delays. However,
real-estate tax amnesties risk encouraging economic agents to build without a licence in protected areas in the belief that they can take advantage of the next general
amnesty.
9 A number of studies of the impact of one-shot and intermittent amnesties exist, including Alm and Beck (1991, 1993), Cassone and Marchese (1995), Crane and
Nourzad (1992), Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998), Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1992), Graetz and Wilde (1993), Mikesell (1986), Stella (1989) and Uchitelle (1989). There
appears to be no rigorous empirical work, as yet, evaluating permanent tax amnesties. Broadly, these studies find that the impact of one-shot amnesties, when pre-,
during and post-amnesty effects have been considered, is highly context-dependent. However, all empirical studies that examine intermittent amnesties found that
they had negative revenue effects.
10The Treaty requires that the debt ratio be “sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value [60 per cent of GDP] at a satisfactory pace”.
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Source: National Institute of Statistics (Istat). Data for 2007 are
government forecasts from the DPEF update for the years 2008-2011,
presented in September 2007.excessive deficit and ask the Italian government to redress the
situation by 2007 at the latest.
In terms of the structural primary balance, i.e. the primary
balance net of the effects of the economic cycle and
temporary measures, there is a rapid worsening in the first six
years of the period considered (more than 6 percentage
points of GDP) and a sizeable improvement (almost 2
percentage points) in the following three years (see Marino et
al., 2007; Kremer et. al., 2006).
2. DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION
Temporary measures and the budget
balance
Since 1997 the chapter “The Public Finances” in the Bank of
Italy’s Annual Report has included information on temporary
measures affecting the budget balance. The criteria followed
to identify these measures have evolved slightly over time,
due also to the appearance of new types of operations.
In this Section we provide an updated description of these
criteria, and brief discussion of them.
11 They are generally in
line with the recommendations of the European Commission
for identifying temporary measures in the context of
multilateral budgetary surveillance (European Commission,
2006).
12 A measure is considered temporary if its impact on
the budget balance is deployed for no longer than three years
or if it shows a high degree of uncertainty.
13 Deficit-
increasing temporary measures are usually not taken into
account. This caution reflects the fact that the aim of the
analysis is to define a prudential  structural balance to
highlight potential risks for the public finances.
14
Whether to account for deficit-increasing temporary
measures and how to do it often require some arbitrary
judgments. An important example is the Italian government’s
decision in 2006 to cancel the State Railways’ debt towards
the State for the creation of the high-speed rail infrastructure.
According to ESA95, the entire amount written off (0.9 per
cent of GDP) was treated as a capital transfer and attributed
to 2006 (the year of the cancellation), although it helped to
finance investment for some years.
The European Commission considered this operation a
temporary measure (European Commission, 2007). This
solution has the drawback of excluding from the structural
balance a component of public expenditure only because it
would be unreasonable to attribute it fully to 2006. Note that
the high-speed rail programme is still in progress and will
require additional resources to be transferred to the State
Railways in the future.
In our analysis of structural developments, the impact of the
debt cancellation on the budget has been spread over the years
2003-06, approximately matching the observed surge in
investment in high-speed infrastructure carried out by the State
Railways (an entity outside the general government). In other
terms, in each year of the period 2003-05 the structural
balance has been worsened by an amount equal to a quarter of
the debt cancelled in 2006, as if the State had transferred
resources to the State Railways for that amount.
Correspondingly, in 2006 only three quarters of the cancelled
debt are considered to be the effect of a temporary measure.
To identify temporary measures it is necessary to define an
objective benchmark for the path of the fiscal variable in a
no-policy-change context. This is fairly straightforward for
revenue items, but it is often difficult for expenditure.
Temporary measures are therefore most often identified on
the revenue side.
15 The same asymmetric treatment is
followed by the Commission and in the literature (see e.g.
Koen and van den Noord, 2005).
The effects on the budget balance of events outside the
control of the government are usually not counted as
temporary measures. In this respect, the indicative list of
temporary measures proposed by the European Commission
(2006) allows only four categories of events to be taken into
account: rulings of the European Court of Justice, decisions
of the European Commission, emergency costs associated
with major natural catastrophes, and the same with military
actions. In the period covered in this study, we include in our
definition of temporary measures only the exceptionally large
impact on the balance of the European Court of Justice’s
ruling of September 2006 regarding VAT. In particular, we
regard as temporary, and thus exclude from the structural
balance for 2006, the entire estimate of the refunds due to
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11 A brief description can also be found in Banca d’Italia (2006).
12 A tentative list of categories of operations that could be considered one-off or temporary measures had already been included in European Commission (2004).
13 If a measure is extended repeatedly, it is considered “temporary” until the extension becomes a routine. At that point, the effects of that measure are attributed to
non-temporary measures starting back from the year of its first introduction.
14 In Europe, the exclusion of deficit-increasing temporary measures is justified by the fact that a government may be tempted to present a deficit-increasing permanent
measure as temporary in order to improve its structural balance.
15 Some exceptions are allowed and included in this study. In particular, we include the change in the timing of pension payments and the lengthening of severance
payment lags for public employees. Temporary measures also include sales of real estate when their amount is exceptionally large. Sales of real estate are included
in the budget among public investments with a negative sign.taxpayers for unduly paid taxes (1.1 per cent of GDP) for the
period from 2003 to September 2006, which will be paid
starting in 2008. It was decided to include refunds for 2006
among temporary measures because the ruling, de facto, has
no effect in the following years, as the Italian government,
while incorporating it into national legislation, also modified
fiscal regulations to compensate for the revenue shortfall
from 2007.
16 While it is necessary to exclude from the
structural balance the effects of this exceptional factor,
17 the
latter was not a voluntary action on the part of government
and is not included in the analysis of Section 3.
The temporary measures included in our analysis are listed in
the Appendix. Table 1 contains our estimates of the total
effects of temporary measures on the budget balance. Even if
the European Commission guidelines are similar to ours, the
estimates tend to be slightly different.
Extraordinary operations and public
debt
In recent years the Banca d’Italia’s official publications of
have provided information on extraordinary operations
affecting the public debt when their impact has been
particularly large. The analyses have usually focused on
sales of real and financial assets and on debt restructuring,
as these operations leave the net worth of the public sector
broadly unchanged but have a temporary impact on the
level of the debt (Table 1). In this respect they can be
considered a type of “window-dressing”.
3. BUYING TIME AT THE RIGHT TIME?
Temporary measures were used extensively in 1997 (1.4
per cent of GDP) owing to the large adjustment required
to join the EMU at a time of still negative cyclical
conditions. A sizeable reduction in interest payments was
expected in the following years, which should have made
up for the phasing out of the temporary measures.
However, the use of temporary measures diminished only
until 2000, and became once more substantial
afterwards.
18 In the whole period 1997-2006, the average
impact on the net borrowing amounted to about one
percentage point of GDP per year, with a peak value of
2.2 per cent in 2003.
19
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Year Temporary measures Extraordinary operations on
Bank of Italy European Commission
2 public debt
1
1997 1.4 - 0.9
1998 1.1 - 1.5
1999 0.1 - 1.4
2000 0.2
3 - 2.2
2001 0.9 - 0.4
2002 1.7 - 2.9
2003 2.2 1.7 2.1
2004 1.9 1.3 0.7
2005 0.9 0.5 0.6
2006 -0.2
4 / -1.3 1.2 -0.4
Average 1.0 (d) 1.2 1.2
Table 1
Estimates of temporary measures and extraordinary operations on the public debt 
(as a percentage of GDP)
1 Sales of financial and real assets, variations in the deposits held by the Bank of Italy and operations of debt restructuring. Figures in this column have
been marginally revised in March 2008 (modifying the version of December 2007) to correct for a computational mistake. 
2 Calculated as difference
between the structural and the cyclically adjusted budget balance published in the 2007 Spring Forecasts. 
3 Excluding sales of UMTS licences. 
4 Excluding
the effect of the ECJ ruling on VAT (-1.1 per cent).
16The European Commission, instead, included among the temporary measures only the estimate of refunds of the undue amounts for the years 2003-2005 (0.75 per
cent of GDP; European Commission, 2007). The estimate of the refunds for the unduly paid taxes in the first three quarters of 2006 (0.35 per cent of GDP) was not
included in the effects of temporary measures and was therefore left in the structural budget.
17 Currently available data suggest that refunds were considerably overestimated and it is very likely that the amount included in the 2006 deficit will be substantially
reduced as soon the relevant information is complete.
18 As mentioned earlier, UMTS receipts are not included in temporary measures but are directly excluded from the nominal balance (see footnote 3).
19The effects of the ruling of the European Court of Justice are not included in this calculation (see Section 2).To understand the role of temporary measures in the period
under scrutiny, in Figure 2 we plot the government forecast
of net borrowing for the year t published in September of the
same year
20 and the same estimate, net of the effects of
temporary measures.
21 In a similar exercise for some EU
countries, Koen and Van der Noord (2004) used the first
notification in year t+1 as the real-time proxy of the deficit
for year t.
22
In five years out of nine the effect of temporary measures is
necessary, according to the government forecasts, to bring
the deficit below the 3 per cent ceiling. Moreover, in 1999
and in 2001 they may have been used to achieve this goal,
given the uncertainty of fiscal forecasts. It is also worth
noting that, when the expected deficit is well above the
ceiling, as in 2005 and 2006, temporary measures decline.
23
Overall, these findings suggest that temporary measures have
been used mainly to buy time, allowing the fiscal authorities
to postpone introducing more structural measures while still
complying with the fiscal rules. This, in turn, raises the
question why the authorities chose to buy time. At least part
of the explanation has to do with the notion, mentioned
earlier, that for a given budgetary impact temporary measures
have less impact on economic activity than permanent
actions. Indeed, policy-makers often justified the use of
temporary measures to comply with fiscal rules as a means of
minimizing the negative impact in a macroeconomic context
perceived to be adverse.
24
Government statements aside, there is some evidence of
temporary measures being used to avoid hampering the
desired cyclical recovery.
25 Real-time estimates of the
output gap indicate that the cyclical position was perceived
as negative in every year of the period 1997-2006 (Figure
3). Moreover, there is a negative, although quantitatively
small, correlation between the change in the size of
temporary measures and the real-time estimates of the
output gap, which suggests a weakly counter-cyclical use of
such actions.
26
It is probably more interesting to check whether, according
to current information, the timing of this “buying-time”
strategy – i.e. waiting for better economic conditions – has
been broadly correct (Figure 3). Clearly, the answer to this
question is “no”. Temporary measures peaked in 2003, when
GDP was still close to potential, and declined afterwards,
when the cyclical low was reached. The correlation between
the change in the impact on the budget of temporary
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20 We use real-time government estimates for net borrowing instead of the currently available estimates because the two sets of data differ considerably in some years
and because the focus here is the analysis of government intentions rather than outcomes. The time of year selected (September) was based on the fact that many
temporary measures were not included in the initial budgetary plans but decided in the course of the year, reflecting new information on budgetary developments.
21 As government forecasts do not specify the expected impact of temporary measures we use our current estimates, adjusting for specific cases. For example, the figure
for 2001 includes the receipts from two securitizations which were only excluded from net borrowing in 2002, following a decision by Eurostat.
22 Koen and Van der Noord (2004) run a logit regression to show that when deficit rules tend to become more binding, recourse to gimmicks is more likely. Similar results
are found in Le Borgne (2006).
23This evidence confirms the intuition underlying recent models of window-dressing behaviour by policy-makers facing fiscal rules (Buti et. al., 2006; Balassone et. al,
2007). In these models, part of the cost of window-dressing comes from the risk of being caught, which increases with the size of the fiscal gimmickery.
24The official documents of the government clearly indicate the perception of an adverse macroeconomic context in the years 2001-05 and the willingness not to
hamper the cyclical recovery through permanent actions. See, for example, Relazione Previsionale e Programmatica (Economic and Financial Planning Document)
for the years 2004-07 (introduction and pages 62-64). The smaller impact of temporary measures on economic activity compared with permanent actions was not
only due to the transitory nature of the former but also to the fact that many involved the voluntary participation of private agents (as in the case of amnesties or
sales of assets).
25 For example, in the Stability Programme submitted at the end of 2002 the government estimated the negative output gap for the same year and for 2003 at around
2 percentage points of GDP; the years 2002-03 were indicated to be the peak of the economic downturn and the negative cyclical component of the deficit was
estimated at around 1 per cent of GDP in both years. Also, for the years 2004-06 the economy was expected “to grow faster than its potential, at around 3 per cent a
year, so as to close the output gap accumulated in 2001 and 2002”.
26 Real-time estimates of the output gap for each year are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook of the previous year, as in Forni and Momigliano (2004). Similar results
can be obtained using other sources.
Figure 2
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(2) Temporary measures in 2001 include securitizations amounting to
0.56 per cent of GDP, which have been excluded from net borrowing in
2002 following a Eurostat decision.measures and the ex-post estimates of the output gap
27 is
fairly large and positive indicating that, ex-post, their use by
the fiscal authorities has been pro-cyclical.
28
The wrong timing of the “buying-time” strategy may be
largely attributed to the unexpected persistence of the
downturn that began in 2001. Policy-makers, as well as
virtually all forecasters (including international institutions),
expected the economy to rapidly return to a favourable
growth path, whereas the low rate of increase in GDP lasted
for five years.
4. PRECIOUS TIME LOST?
In the period 1997-2006 public debt declined from 118.1 to
106.8 per cent of GDP. This outturn is very different from
the objectives set in the government plans for the period. In
particular, in the various stability programmes submitted
between 1998 and 2003 the debt-to-GDP ratio was targeted
to fall by more than 3 percentage points per year on average.
Had this happened, the debt would already have fallen below
the level of GDP in 2003.
The goal of rapidly reducing the debt was, and still is, highly
justified by the expected demographic development in the next
decades, which will entail a substantial increase in expenditure
on pensions, health and long-term care.
29 There is a large
consensus that the appropriate strategy to cope with these
tendencies includes, along with structural reforms, a sizeable
reduction of the debt, leading to lower interest payments.
30
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Figure 3
Temporary measures and output gap
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Per cent of GDP
Ex-post output gap (A) Real-time output gap (B)
Temporary measures (C)
 
A
B
C
Correlation ( A, ΔC ) = 0.69
Correlation ( B, ΔC ) = -0.16
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Figure 4
General government debt and interest expenditure: Italy versus Belgium
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27 Ex-post estimates of the output gap are those of the European Commission (AMECO Database, November 2007).
28 If we include in our estimates of temporary measures the effects of the securitizations carried out in 2001 (see footnote 20), the positive correlation with the ex-post
output gap becomes stronger (0.78), while the correlation with real-time data almost disappears (-0.07).
29 According to the latest official forecasts by the State Accounting Office, the impact of demographic changes on the primary balance can be estimated at between 3
and 4 per cent of GDP by 2030 (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, 2007). These projections do not take into account the risks associated with other factors, such as the
rising cost of medical treatment, which has significantly increased health spending in recent decades throughout the industrial world, and the changes in family
structure and in female employment, which could prompt greater demand for long-term care.
30 At least since the late 80s, Italian policy-makers have been aware of the need to reduce public debt, as the following citation shows, “We achieved the mission [ …] to
free the Italian economy from inflation. We have now another [mission][…]; it requires the same energy, braveness[…]it is the mission to free this economy from the public
debt”, speech of the Treasury Minister G. Amato, July 15 1988, cited in Amato (1990), page 48.In the end, the small decrease in the debt ratio suggests that
time has been lost in preparing for the effects of population
ageing and, in particular, in designing an equitable
distribution of their expected costs across the generations.
31
This conclusion is somehow reinforced by looking at the
recent experience of another high-debt country, Belgium,
which faces similar demographic challenges. Throughout the
1990s, the ratio of general government debt to GDP was
higher in Belgium than in Italy until 1999, when the two
values almost coincided. Both countries had substantially
reduced their debt in the previous years as a result of
consolidation in order to join the EMU. However, between
1999 and 2006 Belgium continued to reduce its debt rapidly,
with the debt ratio falling by around 25 percentage points.
Approximately the same result could have been achieved in
Italy if the targeted annual reduction had been implemented;
by contrast, the actual decline amounted to only 7 points
(Figure 4).
32
The different pace of debt reduction in Italy and Belgium
affected the rate of increase in their interest expenditure. In
1999, interest payment in Belgium was higher than in Italy as
a ratio of GDP (6.8 against 6.6). Thanks to the large debt
reduction, interest expenditure in Belgium declined to 4.0
per cent of GDP in 2006, compared with 4.6 per cent in
Italy. Considering the average cost of Italy’s debt in 2006 (4.5
per cent), if the debt ratio had been reduced by the same
amount as in Belgium, approximately 0.8 per cent of GDP in
interest expenditure would have been saved in 2006
compared with the actual outturn.
The assessment of the progress made towards sustainable
public finances in Italy between 1997 and 2006 worsens if we
consider the effects of some extraordinary operations
concerning debt restructuring and the sale of assets. These
operations have reduced the stock of public debt, leaving the
net worth of the public sector largely unchanged. In other
terms, they have lowered the debt at the cost of raising future
flows of payments or reducing future flows of revenue. 
Over the period 1998-2006, these operations determined an
average impact of approximately 1 percentage point of GDP
per year. Excluding the effects of such operations, the debt to
GDP ratio in 2006 would have reached approximately 116
per cent, a reduction of only 2 percentage points with respect
to the almost 11 points of the actual figure (Figure 5; see
footnote 1 in Table 1).  If the government had replaced the
extraordinary operations undertaken in 1998-2002 by
permanent measures, in 2003 it would have achieved its goal
of bringing the debt level below GDP.
These highly simplified exercises suggest that the use of
extraordinary operations may have allowed the Italian
government, in the face of European pressures to reduce the
debt ratio, to formally satisfy the latter while postponing any
lasting adjustment.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effects on the Italian budget balance
of temporary measures taken in the period 1997-2006, as
well as the effects on the debt of a few extraordinary
operations that left the net worth of the public sector broadly
unchanged. After outlining the criteria followed to identify
these actions, we assess the appropriateness of their use to
achieve budgetary targets.
Our analysis suggests that temporary measures played a
major role in reducing the deficit in most years during the
period considered and helped in formally complying with
EMU fiscal rules. In 1997 the use of temporary measures was
essential in order to meet the convergence deficit criterion set
in the Maastricht Treaty for the adoption of the Euro.
Recourse to temporary measures decreased until 2000,
becoming substantial again afterwards and peaking in 2003.
Policy-makers bought time at the beginning of the downturn,
assuming it to be relatively short. Based on ex-post
information, the timing of this strategy does not seem to have
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* See footnote 1 in Table 1.
31The potential generational imbalance is assessed in Cardarelli and Sartor (1999). The following citation shows the awareness of this problem among policy-makers:
“The reduction of the debt needs to be the first investment of the State in favour of the young people and of the future generations”. Letter of transmission of the
Relazione Previsionale e programmatica for the years 2008-11 to the Parliament by Prime Minister R. Prodi and Treasury Minister T. Padoa-Schioppa, page V.
32The determinants of the different dynamics of the debt ratio in the two countries are examined in Artoni and Ceriani (2007).
Figure 5
The evolution of public debt without extraordinary
operations*
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measures increased sizeably in 2001 and 2002, when cyclical
conditions were worsening but were still above potential, and
declined in 2004 and 2005, when conditions deteriorated
further (the negative peak of the cycle was reached in 2005).
This pro-cyclicality can be attributed to the unexpected
persistence of the downturn that started in 2001; Italian
policy-makers, as well as virtually all forecasters, expected a
rapid recovery, whereas the low growth lasted for five years.
Our analysis also suggests that the use of extraordinary
operations and temporary measures has been short-sighted.
There is a broad consensus that the appropriate strategy to
cope with the upcoming demographic pressures requires a
structural increase in the primary surplus and a drastic
decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio. By contrast, extraordinary
operations have allowed more permanent actions to be
delayed while formally complying with the European fiscal
rules.
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1997  Surcharge on personal income tax  0.24
1997  Tax and social security amnesty  0.04
1997  Shortening of payment lags for oil, methane and electricity taxes  0.15
1997  Lengthening of severance payment lags for public employees  0.15
1997  Advances on indirect tax revenue collection  0.14
1997  Bringing forward of taxation on severance payments  0.32
1997  Taxes paid by the Bank of Italy on extraordinary operations and by UIC on capital gain on the sale of its gold reserves  0.31
1997 Others  0.08
Total  1.43
1998  Increase in the withholding tax for self-employed  0.09
1998  Taxes and social security amnesty and withholding tax on the re-evaluation of corporate fixed assets 0.09
1998  Bringing forward of taxation on severance payments  0.21
1998  Change in the timing of pension payments
1 0.31
1998  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations 0.28
1998  Partial reimbursement fund of the surcharge on personal income tax  -0.07
1998  Advances on indirect tax revenue collection  0.21
Total  1.11
1999  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.09
1999  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.04
1999  Partial reimbursement fund of the surcharge on personal income tax  -0.09
1999 Tax  amnesty  0.01
Total  0.06
2000  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.09
2000  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.12
2000 Tax  amnesty  0.01
2000  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.03
Total  0.24
2001  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.16
2001  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.33
2001  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets  0.40
2001 Tax  amnesty  0.01
2001  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.02
Total  0.92
2002  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.85
2002  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.19
2002  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets  0.16
2002  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporation equities and land properties held by individuals  0.10
2002  Scheme for the repatriation and regularization of assets held abroad  0.11
2002 Tax  amnesty  0.06
2002  Increase in the payment on advance due by tax collectors  0.12
2002  Repayment by banks of reliefs obtained under Law 461 of 23 December 1998  -0.05
2002  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.15
Total  1.69
2003  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.21
2003  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.18
2003  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets 0.14
2003  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporation equities and land properties held by individuals 0.05
2003  Scheme for the repatriation and regularization of assets held abroad 0.05
2003  Increase in the payment on advance due by tax collectors 0.01
2003  Repayment by banks of reliefs obtained under Law 461 of 23 December 1998  -0.02
2003  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.05
2003 Tax  amnesty  1.27
2003  Cancellation of the State’s claims on TAV spa  0.24
Total  2.18
Table 2
Effects of the main temporary measures*
(as a percentage of GDP)TEMPORARY MEASURES IN ITALY: BUYING OR LOSING TIME?
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2004  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.32
2004  Withholding tax on capital gains from transfers of enterprises  0.22
2004  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets  0.28
2004  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporation equities and land properties held by individuals  0.08
2004  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.09
2004  Tax amnesty and regularization of building offences  0.55
2004  Cancellation of the State’s claims on TAV spa  0.23
2004  Tax advances on insurance company  0.05
2004 Others  0.04
Total  1.86
2005  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.22
2005  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets  0.08
2005  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporation equities and land properties held by individuals  0.05
2005  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.17
2005  Regularization of building offences  0.09
2005  Cancellation of the State’s claims on TAV spa  0.23
2005 Sectoral  studies  0.07
2005  Tax advances on insurance company  -0.05
2005 Others  0.04
Total  0.90
2006  VAT reimboursement consequent to ECJ sentence (September 2006)  -1.08
2006  Cancellation of the State’s claims on TAV spa  -0.65
2006  Securitization of agricoltural credits  -0.05
2006  Securitization and sales of public real estate assets  0.09
2006  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate fixed assets  0.29
2006  Withholding tax on the revaluation of corporate equities and land properties held by individuals  0.08
2006  Withholding tax on the revaluation of building sites owned by corporations not yet built  0.02
2006  Swaps and forward rate agreement operations  0.04
2006  Regularization of building offences  0.01
Total  -1.25
Table 2
Effects of the main temporary measures* (cont’d)
(as a percentage of GDP)
* A positive sign is assigned to deficit-reducing measures.
1 Net effect of a lower pension expenditure and a lower revenue from withholding taxes on pension income.